We study a sample of individuals in 20 European countries that includes eight East European countries in order to identify whether these eight countries differ from the Western countries in the popularity of right-wing populist parties once we have controlled for personal attributes. The results show variation among the East European countries while as a whole they are not distinct from Western Europe. In particular, in Hungary and Poland populist right-wing parties enjoy greater support once account is taken of personal attributes. We discuss the reasons for this finding. When it comes to the personal idendities, we find that a right-wing identity, a negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being negative on homosexuality, and mistrust in both the national and the European parliament seem to be the factors heavily correlated with voting for a right-wing populist party in Europe. Men are more likely to vote for a right-wing populist party as are the old and the less educated. Having experienced unemployed also increased the probability of voting for these parties.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to use individual-level survey data to describe broad patterns and regularities in political attitudes towards right-wing populism, defined as the electoral success of populist Right-Wing (PRW) parties in the European Economic Area (EEA) between 2002 and 2014. 1 We choice to focus on the right-wing parties rather than left-wing populist parties due to the former's more sceptical view of the European Union (EU) and immigration, which makes them a greater threat to the future of the EU. We focus on both personal values, economic factors and country of residence. We include nine Eastern European countries and explore whether they differ fundamentally from the Western European ones. Our main empirical question is whether the Eastern European nations are distinct in terms of values when it comes to vote for populist right-wing parties because of their communist heritage or whether economic growth and a higher standard of living has made their value system close to what we find in Western Europe once account is taken of the attributes of individuals.
We control for several individual characteristics, including values. We focus on trust in both domestic and EU institutions; placement on the left/right scale and satisfaction with democracy as representing confidence in the political establishment. Traditional values are measured with attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants and religiosity. Then there is the placement in the income distribution and whether the individual belongs to a minority group as well as his level of education. Personal attributes also involve gender and age and finally there is the important economic factor whether the individual has ever been unemployed for three months or more. What remains to explain is captured by country dummy variables and an objective of the paper is to compare this dummy between individual Eastern European nations and between Eastern European nations, on the one hand, and the Western European ones, on the other hand.
The main innovation of the paper over those surveyed in the following section is to include Eastern European nations, nations that turn out to be quite diverse in their propensity to vote for populist parties. The attitudes and voting patterns of these nations are important for the decision making within the European Union (EU) and it is of some interest to see whether they share a populist sentiment, which may disrupt the operations of the EU. These nations share the experience of having had communist societies that involved central planning, absence of democracy and limited human rights in the form of freedom of expression and freedom of movement. They may also have enjoyed more economic security since unemployment did not exist and education and health care were free of charge in the communist states. This shared history may make these nations more or less prone to vote for populist right-wing parties, which then affects collective decision making at the EU level.
The question whether the economic development that has taken place is linked with changes in values, making them similar to those in the West or whether the cultural heritage of these societies, such as that left by communism, are still dominant.
Literature
The Brexit referendum in the UK in June 2016 as well as the election of Donald Trumps as President of the US has generated an intense interest in the reasons for the success of populist politicians and parties. Below we will give a brief overview of some recent contributions.
What is populism?
According to the political scientist Cass Mudde (see Mudde, 2016) , populist parties tend to challenge prevailing elites and institutions such as the media, universities, mainstream political parties and international organisations. 2 Populists also tend to share a tendency to claim to represent the "people" against the prevailing authorities and institutions and to be led by charismatic leaders. It follows that the populist parties tend to disregard the rights of minorities and even challenge the rule of law.
We are interested in exploring to what extent economic and cultural factors may fuel the emergence of populist parties, in particular the lingering effects of a communist past.
Ingelhart and Norris (2016) The collapse of communism in the early 1990s brought about changes in recent decades.
Following German unification and the fall of the Soviet Union both the former West
Germany and the former East Germany experienced a change towards rational values and an 3 However, in a more recent paper, Guiso et al. (2017) argue that Ingelhart and Norris fail to take into account the decision by voters to abstain from voting rather than voting for populist parties. They find that a combination of the inability of governments to guarantee security has shaken confidence in traditional political parties and institutions, increasing fear beyond that already created by trade and migration. 4 See Bell (1973 Bell ( , 1976 Euroscepticism. Therefore adverse macroeconomic shocks tend to increase the demand for populist political parties. They find that the effect of macroeconomic shocks is almost twice as large on trust towards national as compared to trust towards the European parliament.
Thus, citizens blame national politicians more than their European counterparts for adverse economic conditions. These authors conclude that anti-EU sentiment is more sensitive to national identity and personal attributes than economic factors so that future economic growth will not fully restore support for the European Union. The UK is again clearly an outlier in terms of lack of trust towards the EU and falling trust in recent years in this study.
Populism and financial crises
Financial crises tend to reduce trust in societies and have a greater effect on voters than ordinary recessions. Hence it is possible that they also reduce trust in domestic institutions, political parties and international institutions. Funke et al. (2016) study election data for 20 developed economies going back to the year 1870 and find that polarization rises following financial crises and that voters seem to move towards right-wing populist parties. Hernandez and Kreisi (2016) reach similar conclusions in their study of election outcomes in 30
European countries in the two elections that preceded the latest crisis and the one that followed. They find that falling output, increased unemployment and increased debt resulted in losses for incumbent parties in Western Europe, but less so in Central and Eastern Europe.
There is also the study of Bartels (2014) who found in a sample of 42 elections in 28 OECD countries before and after the Great Recession that 1% growth of GDP increased the voting share of the incumbent party by 1.2%.
Populism and the welfare state
The emergence of populism in the wake of economic recessions and financial crises may be prevented by the creation of a welfare state. Swank and Betz (2003) analysed national elections in 16 European countries from 1981-1988 and found that a welfare state weakens the link between international trade and immigration, on the one hand, and support for the populist right, on the other hand. Mayda et al. (2007) found that the population tends to be less risk averse when it comes to international trade in small countries with higher levels of government expenditures. Finally, Rodrik (1998) argued that since governments can reduce aggregate risk through redistribution and also by providing a stable provision of publicly provided goods and services there was a tendency for more open economies to have larger governments.
Populist parties
We are interested in the propensity of individuals and nations to vote populist right-wing parties (PRW) into power. Table 1 The names and definition of selected variables are listed in Table 2 . 7 The names of the variables are those from the EES with an N_ added to indicate the normalisation from 0 to 1. There are several other dummy variables. These are not belonging to a minority group, gender (1 denoting females), having low education (secondary school or less), middle level or tertiary education and a dummy for those who have been unemployed for 3 months or more.
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In addition, we have three dummy variables for respondent not being religious, being somewhat religious or being highly religious. Finally, there is a dummy variable for each country and each wave of the European Social Survey, starting in 2002.
7 See appendix for exact definitions and sources. 8 The ESS changed its units of measurement for self-placement in the income distribution after their third survey in 2006. In order to account for that difference, the answers before and after the change were normalized. 
Empirical analysis
Pop is a dependent variable which only takes the values 0 and 1, so it does not follow a normal distribution. Therefore, a regression by least squares would produce the wrong standard errors. Running a logistic regression would counter this problem, but the interpretation of the coefficients would be more complicated. Therefore, we choose to use a least-squares regression in order to simplify the interpretation, even though the standard errors for the estimated coefficients might be wrong. We try to account for this problem by running a generalised least-squares regression and using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in the table below. In order to account for unequal inclusion probabilities in the survey and differences in the countries' population size, post-stratification and population weights provided by the ESS are used. The weighted dataset is considered as a random sample of the European population. The Variance Inflation factors (VIF) for each variable revealed that the model contained little multicollinearity.
The generic estimation equation is given by: The coefficients of the independent variables are mostly as predicted. A right-wing identity, a negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being negative towards homosexuality, and mistrust in institutions seem to be the factors heavily correlated with voting for a PRW party. In addition, women are less likely to vote for these parties, as are the young while the low-and mid-level educated are more likely to vote for them compared to the highly educated. Having no experience of being unemployed for at least three months in the past makes one less likely to vote for a PRW party. Thus those with an experience of unemployment are more likely to vote for the PRW parties.
The only perhaps puzzling result is that individuals are more likely to vote for these parties if they place themselves higher in the income distribution. There is also the question why people with "medium religiosity" are less likely to vote for a PRW party than the group of low and high religious respondents.
The coefficients of the normalised values variables can be compared since the variables all take values from zero to one. The largest coefficient is that of being right-wing, there are the coefficients of disliking immigrants, distrusting democracy and not trusting the European parliament. Other coefficients are smaller but show that disliking homosexuals is likely to make people vote for the PRW parties as well as not trusting the national parliament. Thus the typical voter of a PRW party is an older male with experience of unemployment, leaning to the right along the political spectrum, and feeling threatened by immigrants, not trusting democracy and the EU and disliking homosexuals. Somewhat surprisingly, he is not low income according to our estimates. 
Specificities of Eastern Europe
Results in the existing literature would suggest that the socio-economic environment in Eastern European countries is conducive to the emergence and electoral success of populist political movements, in particular right-wing parties. For example, Inglehart and Norris (2016) suggest that countries that have been exposed to major economic displacement and change, along with countries whose culture is traditional and conservative, tend to have larger electoral base for populist right-wing parties. Eastern Europe seems to qualify on both dimensions. Yet, reality happens to be very different. I addition, Eastern Europe also had to go through a painful transition from central planning to market-and price-based economic coordination. Eastern European countries vary considerably in the speed, dynamics, and success of their transition, but there are several common features across the region. The economic changes have led to a substantial growth in in all countries, abuse of political power and influence has often given rise to abuse of market power. For these reasons, it is still rare that incumbents become reelected. Thus, Eastern Europe has been exposed to economic pressures that are at least as severe as those facing old EU member states.
The conservative culture and prevailing social norms in Eastern European societies also suggest that the advance and popularisation of social-liberal ideas and policies would provoke a political backlash. Dustmann et al. (2017) show how traditional values magnify the effect of economic downturns on voters -make them distrust the European Union and national parliaments more and vote for populist parties. Due to the relatively late transition to modernity and the influence of the Soviet bloc, Eastern Europeans were subject to more traditional and conservative standards of behaviour in society and in the family. Furthermore, for somewhat complex reasons, education and the mass media before 1989 emphasized patriotism and even nationalism as opposed to internationalism. Also, as pointed out by Baker and Inglehart (2000) Eastern European cultures and social norms up to the 2000s are strikingly oriented towards social survival and cohesion rather than self-expression.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern European countries have experienced major social and cultural changes: the elimination of national borders, the reduction of national sovereignty, the emigration and immigration of a great number of people, increase in the social acceptability of cohabitation without marriage, abortion, same sex relations and even marriage, etc. In other words, these societies have experienced convergence to beliefs and norms in Western Europe with an emphasis on the individual and self-expression rather than on some sort of a collective identity. In such circumstances of major and fast changes, one would expect that there would be cultural frictions and opposition that may prove beneficial to the growth of right-wing parties.
Yet, our results do not lend support to those hypotheses: They show that Eastern European countries are not more susceptible to right-wing populism than Western European countries. We believe that several factors may account for some of the discrepancy between what prior research would suggest and the estimated country effects. One of these factors is the turbulent history of the region and in particular its turbulent relation with nationalism. On the one hand, the spread of nationalism from Western Europe to Eastern Europe is largely responsible for the creation of national identities in the region, which eventually led to the demise of the four great empires of the East; the Ottoman, the Russian, the Habsburg and the German. The final result was the establishment of the modern nation states of the region by the end of WWI. The whole process, however, turned out to be particularly violent and destructive: Both WWI and WWII were much bloodier and socially more disruptive in the East than in the West. Moreover, the events of the 20 th century emphasize a key political feature of the region: Namely, economic, political and cultural life in the region is caught up in the interplay of Great Powers, specifcially Germany and Russia, which cannot be opposed by any single regional nation state. For example, Germany became a major export market and creditor for most Eastern European countries in the 1930s. As a result, long before WWII, the Nazis used the resulting economic influence to promote their political agenda. Naturally, since their inception all nation states in the region have been actively looking for allies and forms of international cooperation with various degrees of success in order to offset and limit the impact of foreign interference in their own affairs.
In Also, this acceptance of greater European social and economic integration can be traced back to a residual belief that some Western European countries, in particular Germany and the Scandinavian countries, and their peoples, remain role models that should be emulated. Last but not least, the Eastern European countries have a checkered state and institutional tradition. Thus, the alternative to European integration appears to the general public much less attractive than in some old European great powers, such as the UK, France, or Germany.
Relatedly, political interests in Eastern Europe are not institutionalised through political parties, and political parties represent clusters around certain influential political leaders.
Consequently, while authoritarian tendencies may very well be present and even accepted by much of the electorate, right-wing populists in Eastern Europe simply do not have the institutional capacity to impose total (itarian) control on political, economic, and cultural life.
What makes Hungary and Poland different?
On most dimensions, Hungary and Poland appear similar to most other Eastern European
countries. In what follows, we explore possible explanations for the high susceptibility of
Hungarians and Poles to right-wing populism. We believe that the observed patterns can be accounted for by a combination of traditional culture, strong nationalist tradition, and extremely ethnically homogenous population. We suggest that the Europeans in less ethnically homogenous societies are less prone to support right-wing populism not only because exposure to immigrants and minorities somehow makes them more enlightened.
Rather, we believe that ethnic diversity and migration makes everyone aware of the economic, political and social difficulties before the implementation of a right-wing nationalist agenda. In this sense, ethnic diversity undermines the credibility of right-wing policies.
Poland and Hungary experienced high rates of economic growth in the 2000s and the 2010s. Moreover, they did not do worse than the rest of the Eastern or Western European countries during and after the Great Recession. In fact, Poland is the only European country that did not experience even a technical recession following the financial crisis of 2008-2009. While the public finances of Hungary are still a cause for concern, the Hungarian economy has also done reasonably well during the same period. In this context, it is all the more surprising that these two countries have heavily turned to the extreme right in the recent decade or so.
Another puzzling aspect is that both countries, despite some media coverage, have not We investigate further this issue in Figure 1 by plotting the relationship between the estimated country-specific susceptibility to right-wing populism and the share of dominant ethnic groups in the population. A visual inspection of Figure 1 confirms that the tendency to support right-wing populism does not increase in the ethnic diversity of a country. This finding contradicts the notion that ethnic differences increase social tension and the probability of civil conflict on their own. To the contrary, we find that the propensity to support right-wing populist parties increases in the ethnic homogeneity of the country both in Eastern and Western Europe. A linear regression of the susceptibility to right-wing populism on the share of the dominant ethnic groups shows a positive and statistically significant correlation between the two variables. Moreover, Figure 1 suggests that support for rightwing populism may be growing exponentially in the share of the dominant ethnic groups. Table 4 and National statistical bureaus.
We suggest two hypotheses for the observed pattern. First, it may be that interacting a lot with people of diverse background in daily life makes it harder to demonize 'the other' as the source of all social evils. Thus, ethnic diversity may actually promote the (liberal) notion of common human nature and, in turn, universal human rights. Along with this optimistic hypothesis, we also consider a second hypothesis that ethnic diversity does not promote mutual understanding but its existence increases the costs and dangers associated with promoting right-wing policies. In ethnically diverse societies, potential sympathizers are practically aware that the implementation of right-wing nationalistic and populist policies is likely to increase social tension, cause social disruption, and lead to international isolation, if not intervention by more powerful neighbours. The practical difficulties in getting such policies through in diverse societies may actually undermine the electoral credibility of rightwing populism. We leave it to future research to test which of these hypotheses hold.
Conclusions
We have discovered that the Eastern European nations differ internally in their propensity to vote for a PRW party. They have a slightly higher average country effect but vary greatly internally. Thus Hungary and Poland have a greater affinity with such parties while the Baltics, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia have much less. But we can also find comparable countries in Western Europe such as Norway and Denmark, which also are inclined to vote for a PRW party. Poland and Hungary are both former regional powers with homogenous populations where individual politicians are powerful rather than organised parties as in the West. We argue that the diversity of the population of other Eastern European countries makes their culture more liberal; that is more accepting of other ethnic group and less prone to vote for right-wing populists.
The coefficients of the personal attributes have a familiar pattern. A right-wing identity, a negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being negative on homosexuality, and mistrust in institutions seem to be the factors heavily correlated with voting for a PRW party. In addition, women are less likely to vote for these parties, as are the young and the better educated. Having the experience of being unemployed for at least three months in the past makes one more likely to vote for a PRW party. The only surprising result is that individuals are more likely to vote for these parties if they place themselves higher in the income distribution. There is also the question why people with "medium religiosity" are less likely to vote for a PRW party than the group of low-and highly religious respondents.
One limitation of the study is that some political parties which are not considered PRW may have adopted more radical policies to win votes from PRW parties. Therefore, overall populism support could be underestimated. The UK is a good example where the Conservative Party became more populist as a response to the challenge presented by the UK Independence Party. In fact, in the recent study by Dustmann et al. (2017) the Conservative Party is counted among populist parties based on its manifesto.
We conclude that the supporters of free trade and immigration as embodied in the EU charters will have to address the concerns of the dissatisfied part of the population -older, less educated men with traditional values who fear the effect of immigration -as well as the apparently inherent or cultural nationalism in some member countries of the European Union.
